The bedroom tax by Gibbons, Stephen et al.
ISSN 2042-2695 
CEP Discussion Paper No 1537 
April 2018 
The Bedroom Tax 
Stephen Gibbons 
Maria Sánchez-Vidal 
Olmo Silva 
Abstract 
Housing subsidies for low income households are a central pillar of many welfare systems, but an 
expensive one. This paper investigates the consequences of an unusual policy aimed at reducing the 
burden of these subsidies by rationing tenants’ use of space. Specifically, we study a policy introduced 
by the UK Government in 2013 which substantially cut housing benefits for tenants deemed to have a 
‘spare’ bedroom – based on specific criteria related to household composition. Our study is the first to 
evaluate the impacts of the policy on its target group considering a range of outcomes. To do so, we 
use a difference-in-difference methodology that compares the observed behaviour of the treated 
households relative to a control group determined from the details of the policy rules. We find that – as 
expected – the treated group experienced losses to housing benefit and overall income. Although the 
policy was not successful in encouraging residential moves, it did incentivise people who moved to 
downsize – suggesting some success in terms of one of the policy goals, namely reducing ‘under-
occupancy’ in the long run. We find no statistically significant effects on households’ food 
consumption, savings or employment outcomes, despite the associated income reductions. Finally, we 
find some evidence of a reduction in self-reported satisfaction though this effect is not precisely 
estimated. 
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1. Introduction
Housing subsidies for low income households are a central pillar of many welfare systems, but an 
expensive one. In Britain in 2015/16, housing benefit expenditure was £24.2 billion, amounting to 14% 
of total expenditure on benefits – an increase of 43% in real terms in the 20 years since 1996/7.1 
Attempts have been made to control these expenditures, in Britain and in similar schemes world-wide, 
spawning a small academic literature on the effect of these reforms on rents (Susin, 2002, Gibbons and 
Manning, 2006, Fack, 2006, Kangasharju, 2010, Viren, 2013, Brewer et al 2014). This paper investigates 
the consequences of an unusual policy aimed at reducing the burden of these housing subsidies by 
rationing tenants’ use of space and reallocating the social housing stock. 
In April 2012, the UK Government voted for a policy which took effect in April 2013 to reduce 
subsidy payments (housing benefit) for social tenants deemed to have a ‘spare’ bedroom on the basis of 
specific criteria related to household composition. This policy – officially named the ‘under-occupancy 
penalty’ –was much criticised for its draconian regulation of low income tenants’ entitlement to space 
and for its potential adverse impacts on their welfare (Shelter, 2013). The policy was euphemistically 
labelled the ‘removal of the spare room subsidy’ by its advocates, but was more commonly known as the 
‘bedroom tax’. The policy targeted new and existing social tenants – that is, tenants in Local Authority 
(LA) provided housing or accommodation provided by housing associations and other registered social 
landlords – but did not directly affect those in or entering private rental accommodation, even if they 
were claiming housing benefits. 
Our study is the first to evaluate the impacts of the policy on its target group considering a range of 
outcomes and using a difference-in-difference methodology that compares the observed behaviour of 
treated families with the outcomes of a suitable control group. Although an official evaluation exists – 
using a survey of affected tenants and a small sample of controls (Clarke et al., 2015) – this provides no 
explicit treatment-control comparisons, no pre-policy survey and no adjustments for differential 
household characteristics.  
In order to carry out our investigation, we use a large panel survey of individuals and households – 
the Understanding Society (US) survey – covering the period 2009 to 2014. We carefully define our 
treatment and control groups according to the policy rules. Specifically, this means we first take the 
subset of the survey respondents who are social tenants in receipt of housing benefits and who have no 
retired household members. We then define the treated group as the set of households that are ‘under-
occupying’ their accommodation using the official criteria – while the control group comprises of 
households who do not ‘under-occupy’ their residence. The details on these under-occupancy criteria are 
1 Source: Department of Work and Pensions, Benefit expenditure and caseload tables, 2016 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/554069/benefit-expenditure-by-
country-and-region-2015-16.ods 
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described later in the paper, but broadly depend on the number of adults and on the number of children – 
with the number of rooms ‘available’ for the latter depending on their age and gender. We estimate the 
effect of the policy using regression analysis on household or individual level data, with individual or 
household fixed effects and controls for household composition and characteristics. This design means 
that we compare the pre-post policy changes in outcomes for social tenant households who under-occupy 
their accommodation with the pre-post policy changes for comparable households who do not.  
The sample restrictions dictated by this research design imply that we end up with a relatively small 
sample of 198 treated households and 620 control households. However, we observe these households 
multiple times before and after the policy intervention date. Moreover, the relative persistence over time 
of the outcomes we study in the absence of any policy treatment effects imparts our study with more 
statistical power than these sample sizes might at first suggest.  
In a nutshell, we find that, as expected, the treated group experienced losses to housing benefits and 
overall income. However, the policy was unsuccessful in encouraging residential moves – though tenants 
who moved did downsize. We are unable to find the margins on which tenants adjusted to these income 
reductions, apart from a small increase in youth employment. We find no adjustment to food 
consumption or savings, although changes in consumption featured in studies based on self-reported 
behaviour in Clarke at al. (2015) and Bragg et al (2015). Somewhat in line with what was predicted by its 
critics, the policy reduced well-being, at least in so far as this is captured by some derived measure of 
material deprivation and self-reported measures of life satisfaction – as well as satisfaction with health, 
income and amount of leisure time. However, most of these effects are not statistically significant or 
large. Finally, we study whether our results are heterogeneous along several geographical dimensions. 
Broadly speaking, we find that the ‘bedroom tax’ had a stronger impact on households’ benefits, income 
levels and deprivation in more urban areas, in London and in parts of England and Wales with higher 
housing costs. However, once again, none of these patterns is statistically significant. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide some institutional 
context. In Section 3, we discuss the data we use and in Section 4 we present our empirical methods. In 
Section 5, we present descriptive statistics, while in Section 6 and 7 we present our household and 
individual level findings, respectively. Finally, Section 8 provides some concluding remarks. 
2. Institutional context
In 2013 – at the time of the enforcement of the ‘bedroom tax’ – approximately 5 million individuals 
received housing benefits. Of these, around 3.4 million were accommodated in units provided by Local 
Authorities (LAs or councils) and registered social landlord and housing associations (i.e., not-for-profit 
organisations that provide homes for people in housing need), while 1.6 million were housed in privately 
owned accommodations. Given the number of households in the UK (approximately, 26 million in 2011), 
this means that roughly 13% of families in the UK occupy social housing – with this figure increasing to 
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19% if households in private accommodations but on housing benefits are included. This corresponds to 
approximately 45%-50% of all households renting in the UK. 
The percentage of ‘social renters’ has remained relatively stable since the early 2000s. Furthermore, 
over the past two decades, LAs and housing associations have continued to accommodate the largest 
share of needy individuals on housing benefits – with a split of approximately 40% and 60% respectively. 
However, relative to the 1970s and 1980s, the stock of social housing has significantly shrunk with no 
new supply brought to the market as well as councils and housing associations selling part of their estates. 
This decline was partly driven by policy decisions aimed at promoting homeownership – such as the 
“right-to-buy” scheme introduced by Margaret Thatcher in 1980 – as well as a change in the perceived 
aims of publicly provided housing which came to be seen as a tool to provide accommodations to 
individuals in extreme needs (see Hills, 2007 and Holmans 2005 for a more detailed historical account). 
Notwithstanding, the incidence of (relative) poverty climbed during this same period – especially during 
the 1980s – and has remained stable since then (see Belfield et al., 2014). 
As a result of these opposing trends, publicly provided housing today mainly accommodates poor 
households and demand for social housing greatly outstrips supply – with long waiting lists in order to 
obtain publicly provided housing (1.16 million households were on the waiting list for 1.59 million 
council houses in England in 2017)
2
. In order to ration social housing provision, LAs and housing 
associations have regulations that vary in their exact details. These specify who is eligible – although 
evidence of ‘needs’ is paramount – as well as how long an individual or a household need to have resided 
in the area in order to be considered. Furthermore, some LAs grant an element of choice to households 
on their waiting list – offering them the opportunity to bid for specific accommodations – while others 
simply operate a direct offer system with no choice components. Finally, different LAs have different 
regulations regarding the size of the property for which a household will be considered. Some attention is 
given to the number of household members, their age, their gender and their relationship. However, 
central government guidelines dictate that priority should be given to the homeless, to those living in 
unsanitary or overcrowded conditions, and to those who need to live in a given location because of 
special medical/welfare reasons. Therefore, when allocating social housing, the precise alignment of 
accommodation type to family circumstances is second order to issues of basic household need and the 
availability of different types of local accommodation.   
Another important aspect to bear in mind is that social tenants are offered a right to occupy their 
property indefinitely – i.e., they do not need to move if their household composition and characteristics 
change. LAs and housing associations try to promote tenants’ mobility – especially when these occupy 
accommodations that are ‘too large’ so that other families in overcrowded conditions can be moved in. 
However, historically there has been no compulsion or explicit sanction for under-occupancy. 
2 Source: Ministry of Housing Communities and Local Government online tables: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/live-tables-on-rents-lettings-and-tenancies 
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Taken together, these aspects suggest that when the ‘bedroom tax’ reform was introduced, a number 
of households were occupying accommodations deemed ‘too big’ for them (we will clarify what this 
means later in this section). This situation will have arisen either because they were initially allocated to 
an over-size accommodation due to a shortage of properties that better suited them, or because of 
subsequent changes in their household composition (e.g., a child ageing and leaving home). 
Housing benefits in Britain are calculated on the basis of local social housing rents with some 
deductions if the household income is above a certain threshold. In turn, social housing rents at the time 
of the bedroom tax policy were calculated from a formula, which aimed to bring LA rents in line with 
housing association rents and provide consistency in rents across different areas. This formula starts from 
a baseline anchored to mean national housing association rents in 2000 (£53.50 per week, at a time when 
private sector rents were around £85). Rents are then updated over time and across space using a formula 
that adjusts this baseline by: a- multiplying it by ratio of the average ‘manual’ (unskilled) earnings of 
individuals in the county relative to the national average; b- considering a ‘bedroom factor’ that reduces 
rents for smaller accommodation; c- modifying them to reflect average housing prices in the LA relative 
to national ones in 1999; d- adusting for inflation using the retail price index.
3
 This approach gives rise to 
wide variations in terms of rents – and thus housing benefits offered to individuals – across the UK. For 
example, in 2013-2014 on average, the weekly benefit for households in accommodations provided by 
LAs and housing associations were approximately £80. However, families living in the most expensive 
areas of the UK – for example the boroughs of Westminster, Camden, Hackney and Kensington – would 
receive up to £85 more, while families in the cheapest area of the country – Moray, a Scottish council – 
would receive around £25 less. Similarly, families in London would receive higher benefits, while 
households in other large urban conurbations – e.g., Manchester, Liverpool and Newcastle – would 
receive about the average amount of housing benefits.
4
  
Note also that most individuals living in housing provided by councils do not actually pay any rents 
or receive any benefits – as these are transferred directly from the government to the ‘housing account’ 
of the LA. Similar arrangements are often set up for individuals occupying housing provided by social 
landlords and housing associations – though the arrangements in this part of the sector can vary.5  
Against this backdrop, the UK Government passed legislation in April 2012 taking effect in April 
2013 that would reduce housing benefits for social tenants deemed to have a ‘spare’ bedroom. The aim 
3 Note that factors a and b had a weight of 70%, while c had a weight of 30% in this calculation. Our figure for 
private sector rents is taken from Udagawa and Tang (2008). Details of the rent formula are available in HCA 
(2015). 
4 These figures and considerations refer to individuals in accommodations owned by LAs and housing associations. 
Individuals eligible for housing support but renting privately owned accommodations received rents in proportion 
to a Local Housing Allowance (LHA) calculated on the basis of an adjusted private sector rent that varies according 
to the number of available rooms in the property. As these individuals were not subject to the ‘bedroom tax’ we do 
not discuss this part of the publicly-supported housing market in any more details. 
5 Once again, the arrangements are different for individuals receiving housing benefits but occupying privately 
owned accommodations. These receive the benefits in their accounts and are responsible for paying rents to the 
private landlord. 
5 
of the legislation was twofold. On the one hand, this was an attempt to curb increases in social housing 
expenditure, which had been steadily rising since the 1990s. On the other hand, the Government was 
hoping to promote mobility and the reallocation of the social housing stock to better match households’ 
size and needs given that – as discussed above – for historical and institutional reasons some families 
occupying more space than needed coexisted in the sector with households living in over-crowding 
conditions.  
In particular, the ‘bedroom tax’ legislation dictated that one bedroom would be allowed for the 
following groups: a- every adult couple; b- any other adult aged 16 or over – including any son, 
daughter, stepson/stepdaughter; c- two children under 10; d- two children under 16 of the same sex; e- 
any other child (where, for example, there are three children under 10). Anyone deemed as having one 
spare bedroom would face a 14% cut in the benefits, while households with two under-occupied rooms 
would face cuts of 25%.  
According to official figures, approximately 600,000 – or nearly 20% of social housing tenants on 
benefits – were liable for the ‘bedroom tax’ in 2013. This would imply average shortfalls of £11 and £20 
for one and two under-occupied rooms respectively – and up to £23-£40 in the most expensive parts of 
the country. Note that these shortfalls had to be paid in cash directly from the tenants to the LA or 
housing association – unlike rents which (as discussed) were usually directly offset against benefits – 
making this a salient and significant cut in individuals’ finances.  
To help social tenants deal with the ‘bedroom tax’, councils, housing associations and housing 
charities (such as Shelter) published a number of advisory guidelines. These included recommending 
social tenants to take on some additional work – as well as providing some discussions of the potential 
implications in terms of deductions from housing benefits for earnings above certain thresholds – and 
taking on lodgers (legally allowed if agreed with the owner of the property). Furthermore, councils and 
LAs created or improved their ‘housing swap’ portals and websites with the aim of coordinating the 
mobility of tenants on housing benefits to more suitable accommodations within the social sector – thus 
avoiding payment of the ‘bedroom tax’.  
More drastic measures were taken by the Scottish Government which between 2013/2014 and 
2016/2017 injected £125 million of additional funding for Discretionary Housing Payments to mitigate 
the effects of the bedroom tax
6, and by Northern Ireland where the ‘bedroom tax’ was not put in place till 
February 2017 – and even then came with a large associated mitigation fund.7  
Given these considerations, in the analysis that follows, we focus on England and Wales – while 
excluding Scotland and Northern Ireland – and study whether the ‘bedroom tax’ had an impact on a 
6 See Section 7.3 of the Welfare Reform official Scottish documentation available at: 
http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2017/06/6808/8#s73 
7 See official documentation available at:  
https://www.nihe.gov.uk/index/advice/advice_for_housing_executive_tenants/benefits-social-sector-size-criteria-
bedroom-tax.htm  
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broad range of households’ and individuals’ outcomes, such as mobility, household size and composition 
as well as labour force participation and earnings. 
3. Data construction
We use household and individual level data from the Understanding Society (US) survey. US is a 
longitudinal annual survey conducted by the Institute for Social and Economic Research (ISER) at Essex 
University. The sample was selected to be nationally representative of households in the UK and every 
adult member of the sampled households (age 16 or above) is interviewed using a computer assisted 
personal interview (CAPI) software. One individual per household – usually the household head – 
answers the household questionnaire. Younger individuals (age 10-15) respond to a shorter, self-
completion questionnaire. 
The first wave was collected during the time window covering January 2009 and 2011, and at 
present five data waves are available. The same households and individuals sampled in the first wave are 
re-interviewed in subsequent waves – approximately 12 months after the first survey. Households and 
individuals who move within the UK are followed to their new address, and new individuals joining the 
sampled households are also interviewed. The first two waves included approximately 30,000 individuals 
though the number progressively declined towards 25,000 in the subsequent waves. 
The survey covers a number of topics including family structure, educational attainments, labour 
market outcomes, financial resources, tenure and housing conditions, and benefit eligibility and claims. 
As such, it is well designed to study the impact of policy interventions as well as general trends in socio-
economic outcomes in the UK population. 
For our analysis, we retain data covering the period 2009 to 2014. Given that the ‘bedroom tax’ policy 
was announced in April 2012 and enforced in April 2013, this gives 3 years and 4 months of data before 
the announcement of the reform and 2 years and 8 months after it. Since the reform targeted families 
already in social housing and receiving housing benefits, we only keep households who are social tenants 
on housing benefits in the pre-policy period (more precisely, in the last observation before the policy 
announcement).. This group includes tenants in LA-provided housing as well as households in 
accommodation provided by housing associations and other registered social landlords. On the other 
hand, we exclude families on social benefits but in private rental accommodation as these families were 
not targeted by the policy. As discussed in Section 2, we also exclude Scotland and Northern Ireland as 
these put in places measures that likely neutralized the effects or delayed the implementation of the 
‘bedroom tax’.8 Given the policy did not apply to families containing a retired person, we only keep 
households in the sample if they include a male aged below 60 or a woman aged below 55 – i.e., five 
years before retirement age. As already mentioned, the policy affected families with a ‘spare room’. The 
8 We considered using Scotland as ‘control’ country to investigate the impact of the ‘bedroom tax’ by comparing 
individuals just north/south of the border with England. Unfortunately, the US does not sample a sufficient number 
of households to give enough geographical density to properly implement this research design. 
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notion of spare room was based on very detailed criteria about room occupancy that would take into 
account the age, gender and the relationship between household members. These criteria are discussed in 
detail in the next section, when we define ‘treated’ and ‘control’ households – i.e., those with and 
without a spare room.  
We investigate outcomes at both the household and the individual level. At household-level, we 
extract a wide ranging set of outcome variables. To capture possible effects on household size and space 
we use number of bedrooms, number of household members and number of rooms per person – taken 
directly from the household-level questionnaire. For residential mobility, we construct a dummy 
indicating whether the households’ spatial location (geographical coordinates) has changed between one 
survey and the next. Household overall income, labour income and social benefits income variables are 
derived by aggregating the individual-level data across household members.
9
Given that the reform 
entailed a cut in housing subsidies for the affected households, we also single out the amount of housing 
subsidies received by the household from the total income obtained from benefits. Saving behaviour is 
represented by a dummy variable identifying whether the household makes some savings at the end of 
the month, and a continuous variable that measures the weekly amount of money spent on food. 
The approach of McFall and Garrington (2011) is used to construct three proxies for households’ 
material deprivation. The first one is an indicator of ‘lifestyle changes’ that considers answers to the 
following questions: whether the occupied house is in decent state of repair; whether the household takes 
holidays at least once per year; whether worn out furniture can be replaced; whether the household has 
insurance; whether major electrical goods can be replaced/repaired; and whether individuals in the 
household have money for their selves. The second indicator gathers information about ‘financial stress’ 
by considering whether the household is able to: keep up with bills; keep up with council tax payments; 
keep up with rents; and overall up to date with all bills. The third indicator, instead, relates to ‘durable 
good purchase’ and considers the following items: colour TV; video/DVD; satellite; cable TV; deep 
freezer; washing machine; tumble drier; dish washer; microwave; home PC; compact disc player; 
landline telephone; mobile phone. In order to analyse whether the policy had an impact on levels of 
deprivation, we construct three separate indicators by summing the various items in the three different 
groups – i.e. ‘lifestyle’, ‘financial stress’ and ‘durable goods’ – and then standardizing the resulting 
numbers in the full sample (i.e., prior to only focussing on households on benefits and in council/housing 
association provided accommodations). Given the way in which answers are coded in US, larger values 
of the ‘lifestyle’ and ‘financial stress’ variables correspond to worse outcomes, while smaller values of 
the ‘durable goods’ variable correspond to worsening standards of living. An overall material deprivation 
index is obtained by summing all the answers in the ‘lifestyle’ and ‘financial stress’ categories and 
subtracting the ‘durable good’ answers – and standardizing the resulting figures in the full sample. 
Larger values of this indicator correspond to worse material standards of living. 
9 Note that since income questions refer to monthly amounts, we obtain weekly figures by multiplying all numbers 
by 12 and dividing it by 52. This follows standard practice. 
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We also look at a number of individual-level outcomes. These are useful in assessing whether the 
policy had differential impacts on different household members depending on their characteristics. A 
dummy indicator captures whether or not the respondent is in paid employment at the survey date. We 
also look at income received overall, from labour activities and in the form of benefits – i.e., we analyse 
the individual-level variables we used to construct the household-level income information discussed 
above. Life satisfaction is measured on four dimensions: their health; their income; the amount of leisure 
they can enjoy; and with their life overall. The answers to these questions range from “Completely 
dissatisfied” – coded to 1 – to “Completely satisfied” – coded to 7. We treat this variable as ordinal with 
larger values corresponding to higher levels of satisfaction – though in some checks we investigated 
whether our findings are robust to dichotomising these indicators. 
Descriptive statistics and number of observations for the retained households, individuals and 
variables are provided in Section 5 – after we discuss our empirical methods and the definition of 
affected and unaffected households in the next section. 
4. Empirical methods
The aim of our analysis is to estimate the causal effect of the bedroom tax policy on a number of 
household and individual level outcomes for people in social housing and on housing benefits. The 
nature of the policy implies treatment was not randomly allocated – rather, it was determined on the basis 
of information about household size and composition, in relation to the number of rooms in the occupied 
accommodation. The main concern is that the same household and individual characteristics that 
determine treatment might be correlated with the outcomes under analysis – either directly or through 
other unobservable individual/household level attributes – preventing us from estimating the causal 
impact of the ‘bedroom tax’.  
Our strategy for estimating this impact is to compare the pre-post-policy change (before and after 
April 2013) in outcomes for treated households/individuals who had a spare room according to the policy 
rules with the pre-post-policy change in outcomes for comparable households/individuals who did not. 
We do this using the following fixed effects, difference-in-difference regression specification, which we 
describe first for the household case: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑙 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 × 𝐼(𝑡 ≥ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑂𝑛) + ∑ 𝑋𝑖
𝑝𝑟𝑒  × 𝐼(𝑡 ≥ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑂𝑛)Λ′ + 𝜃𝑡𝑙 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑙 (1)
In this specification 𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑙  denotes outcome for household i at time t and living in LA l; 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖
identifies whether the household is subject to the bedroom tax; and 𝑡 ≥ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑂𝑛  identifies the 
observations following the enforcement of the policy (i.e., April 2013; in some robustness checks we use 
the policy announcement in April 2012 as the cut-off date). In some versions of the specification we look 
at differences between the effects of the policy on households who moved home at some point between 
the policy announcement and the end of our observation window – and those who did not – by 
interacting the treatment post-policy dummy with the mover indicator.  
9 
Our specification further controls for differential time trends using interactions between the policy-
on indicator and household characteristics ( 𝑋𝑖
𝑝𝑟𝑒) measured prior to the policy announcement
(specifically, average age, length of tenure in current accommodation and number of bedrooms per 
person), and with LA-by-year of survey fixed effects (𝜃𝑡𝑙). The unobservable 𝛼𝑖 is a household-level
fixed effect, potentially correlated with treatment, while 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑙 is an error term assumed to be uncorrelated
with the other variables in our empirical model. Parameter δ is the parameter of interest. 10 
This equation is estimated on the sample of social housing tenants, receiving housing benefits, 
extracted from the US data from 2009-2014 and described in Section 3. Estimation is by Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) even when the dependent variable is a binary outcome. Since we do not have a balanced 
number of observations per household before/after the policy, and given that we do not expect any 
effects to result in one-year changes in the considered outcomes, we control for fixed effects by within-
group differencing – rather than first differencing.11 Standard errors are clustered at the household level, 
to allow for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation within households.  
We categorise families in our data as treated or non-treated by inferring whether they would have 
been affected by the policy according to its rules. This is done by comparing the information on 
household composition and accommodation size, with the detailed and specific policy criteria used by 
the government to establish whether families had a spare room. Household and accommodation 
characteristics those recorded in the last household observation prior to April 2012 when the policy was 
announced. As discussed, the legislation dictated that one bedroom would be allowed for the following 
main groups: a- every adult couple; b- any other adult aged 16 or over – including any son, daughter, 
stepson/stepdaughter; c- two children under 10; d- two children under 16 of the same sex; e- any other 
child (where, for example, there are three children under 10). Although these were the main features of 
the legislation, specific guidelines were provided for individuals with disabilities and their carers – for 
example, two adults forming a couple could occupy different rooms if one or both individuals had 
disabilities making it more appropriate to have separate spaces within the house. Other exceptions were 
also made for individuals serving in the armed forces and/or for students residing away from home – 
depending on whether their residence had been permanently moved or they could still be considered as 
residing with the original household. In order to determine households with a ‘spare room’, we only 
consider the main categories as we are not able to identify individuals that fall into these exceptions. This 
omission is unlikely to substantially affect our treatment and control group variables as these groups 
should only involve small numbers of individuals. 
Based on these guidelines, we consider a household as ‘treated’ if it occupies more rooms than it is 
entitled to. Conversely, we label a household as a control if it resides in an accommodation with the 
10 Note that we also include wave and month-of-interview dummies; however, we do not index these in our 
equation to simplify notation. 
11 Not all households are interviewed at the same time because the US survey period covers up to two years per 
wave. This means that not all households will be interviewed the same number of months before/after the policy 
further making it difficult to work with first-differenced data. 
10 
correct number of rooms given its demographic structure. Note that the policy dictated that social tenants 
with one under-occupied room would face a 14% cut in the benefits; while households on benefits with 
two under-occupied rooms would face cuts of 25%. In our data, most treated households have one under-
occupied room so we do not consider this distinction.
12
  
The identifying assumption in this difference-in-difference/fixed-effects panel design is that 
treatment – having a spare room, as defined by these arbitrary and nuanced policy rules – is effectively 
random, conditional on the fixed effects and the control variables included in the regression. This 
assumption seems justifiable given that having a spare room or not under these rules was largely an 
outcome of ‘historical accident’ related to the kind of accommodation the family was originally given 
and subsequent changes in household age and composition (see discussion in Section 2). We discuss the 
empirical validity of this assumption in the next section where we look at ‘balancing’ of characteristics in 
the treatment and control groups. Notwithstanding these considerations, treatment is essentially an 
indicator of a very specific set of interactions between household size, number of bedrooms and the age 
of household members. It is therefore important to control for other more general trends related to these 
factors which might drive the pre-post policy change in outcomes. The interactions terms between pre-
determined household characteristics (age, length of tenure and bedrooms per person) and the policy-on 
dummy included in our empirical model (1) play precisely this role, and capture the impact of time 
trends in outcomes that could be related to family structure and accommodation size. Furthermore, LA-
by-year dummies control for unobserved time-varying shocks at the LA level – e.g., changes in the 
affordability of housing or other possible housing-related local policy changes – that might be related to 
both treatment and outcomes.
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Some outcomes – employment, income, wellbeing – can be studied at the individual rather than 
household level. An individual-level analysis also allows us to study whether the impact of the policy 
was heterogeneous according to background characteristics of household members – for example, their 
age in April 2012 or gender. When we study individual level outcomes, we replace household fixed 
effects in equation (1) with individual fixed effects and cluster our standard level at this level.
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Treatment is still defined at the household level and based on the households where individuals resided at 
April 2012 – i.e., at the point of the policy announcement – and the specification is identical in all other 
ways. We continue to control for pre-determined household level characteristics interacted with the 
12 This approach defines ‘treatment’ using household composition before the policy announcement and holding it 
fixed over time. However, households might switch status because of changes to their composition that can be 
considered exogenous – e.g., the ageing of a child that makes him/her entitled to a room. In some extensions, we 
explored whether our results differed if we allowed the treatment status to change on the basis of characteristics that 
households cannot manipulate (i.e., mainly the gender and age of the children) but they remained the same. 
13 Braakman and McDonald (2015) investigate the impact of changes in the Local Housing Allowance (LHA) on 
property prices. Although this reform occurred at the same time as the ‘bedroom tax’ we analyse, the implied 
variation in the LHA changes was at the LA-by-year level – so any potential confounding effects are controlled for 
in our specifications. It should also be noticed that relative to the potential subsidy cuts implied by the ‘bedroom 
tax’ policy, reforms to the LHA amounted to relatively small reductions in housing benefits. 
14 We also tried clustering at the household level and it did not alter our main conclusions. 
11 
policy-on variable and for the LA-by-year shocks. To investigate heterogeneity, we augment our models 
with interactions between the term 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 × 𝐼(𝑡 ≥ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑂𝑛) and the relevant individual attribute 𝑍𝑖 .
We further control for possible changes in the effect of this attribute following the policy reform that are 
common among treated and untreated individuals – i.e., we include in our models the term 𝐼(𝑡 ≥
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑂𝑛) × 𝑍𝑖. On the other hand, since all the characteristics we consider are time-fixed, their direct
impact on the outcome is absorbed by the individual fixed effect.
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5. Descriptive statistics
We present the first set of descriptive statistics in Table 1. This reports information at the household (top 
panel) and individual (bottom panel) level for the variables used in our analysis. These are measured in 
the last observation period prior to the policy announcement and tabulated for the treated and control 
groups.  
As shown in the top panel, there are overall 198 treated households and 620 controls, meaning that 
around 32% of households in our base sample of social tenants on housing benefits are in the treated 
group.
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 Treated households include approximately 2.1 members and occupy accommodations with 
approximately 2.7 rooms – giving rise to an average bedroom/person ratio of around 1.6.  Note that this 
variable is not particularly skewed – with a median value of 1.5 and the bottom/top quartiles at 1 and 2, 
respectively. However, the top 10% of the households report to have three rooms per person, while the 
household with the smallest occupancy ratio has four rooms per member of the family (coming from one 
person in an accommodation with four rooms). Treated household’s average rate of mobility is 6% while 
the overall weekly income is approximately £317. Most of this comes from social benefits (£269) with 
only a small contribution from labour income (£41). Note that housing subsidies account for nearly 30% 
of the social benefits. Only around 16% of the treated households report that they manage to save money, 
and the average weekly food expenditure is £48.2. We also find that treated households have higher level 
of deprivation along all the margins we consider than the average household in the US (recall that these 
variables are standardized in the full sample – i.e., prior to focussing only on treated/control households 
in England and Wales).  
The second panel presents data at the individual level. We have 293 treated working age adults with 
non-missing basic labour market outcomes (i.e., work or not) in our sample and nearly 1,000 control 
individuals – though the exact number of observations varies depending on the variable considered. 
15 This ‘interaction’ approach assumes that all other controls have the same impact on the outcome under analysis 
irrespective on the individual’s characteristics. An alternative split-sample approach is more flexible in this respect 
but at the cost of being inefficient (i.e., it does not impose restrictions on the data to improve precision). Given that 
we have a limited number of observations, we have decided not to follow this route. However, we checked that the 
main patterns survive even when we use a split-sample approach. 
16 Further statistics not reported show that approximately 57% of household that rent the property they inhabit are 
‘social tenants’ and that – of these – approximately 18% are subject to the ‘bedroom tax’. These figures line up with 
the numbers discussed in Section 2 for the whole of the UK.  
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Working age adults are defined as males aged 16 to 60, and women aged 16 to 55. Approximately 22% 
of these are working. As expected, the individual weekly income levels are smaller than the household 
level amounts but the relative importance of benefits vis-à-vis employment income also emerges when 
focussing on individual data. Finally, the average level of satisfaction ranges from 3 for income – below 
the middle of the 1 to 7 scale – to 4 for leisure – i.e., at its mean level. 
Table 1 also presents some descriptive statistics for households and individuals in the control group 
and compares them with the households and individuals in the treatment group.. As expected, given the 
nature of the bedroom tax, treated households have significantly more bedrooms per person. This 
difference is driven by a smaller number of individuals in treated families and a larger number of rooms 
– both discrepancies being significant.17 Treated households also have a significantly higher average age
(approx. 9.43 years or 35% older than the control group) and longer tenure (3 years or around 38% more 
years than the control families). As discussed – and given the possibility that these pre-determined 
demographic characteristics could affect households’ (and individuals’) outcomes following treatment – 
in our specification we control for an interaction between these attributes and the dummy identifying the 
policy-on periods. However, any time-fixed effect of these attributes – and related unobservable 
characteristics – on our outcomes of interest is absorbed by the household fixed effects we use 
throughout our analysis. 
Further down the table, we see that the average rate of mobility is lower for treated households – 
though the difference is not statistically significant. Furthermore, there are some differences in the levels 
of income – though most of these are not statistically significant, especially when controlling for LA-by-
year effects. These differences show that treated households have lower levels of overall weekly income 
than the control – by approximately 9% – and that almost all of the difference comes from social benefit 
payments. There are instead no differences in the percentage of households able to save some money, 
and a small (approx. 20%) but significant difference in weekly food expenditure.
18
 Similarly, we find no 
differences in the levels of deprivation for all the items we consider. 
At the individual level we find less evidence of discrepancies in income levels, though once again 
the observed differences suggest that treated households earn slightly less – with social benefits 
explaining this gap. Note also that there are no substantial differences in the probability of working, and 
that individuals in treated households are less satisfied – between 0.19 and 0.91 points on the 1-7 scale, 
depending on the satisfaction measure – with many of these differences being significant. 
Appendix Tables 1 to 3 provide more descriptive information about our sample. There are 
approximately 620 observations before and 280 observations after the policy was implemented for the 
198 treated households. The corresponding figures for the 620 families in the control groups are 
approximately 1,950 and 940. Furthermore, 31 and 119 households in the treated and control groups 
17 Note that largest number of rooms per person in the control group is one, the minimum is zero (studio flats) and 
the top/bottom quartiles are 0.6 and 1, respectively. 
18 We find similar imbalances (similarly significant) if we focus on food expenditure per person. This suggests that 
different household sizes between treated and control units do fully not explain the differences visible in Table 1. 
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respectively can be identified as movers – with roughly equal mobility instances in the two groups before 
and after the policy change (proportionally). The underlying number of individuals within these 
households is 412 in the treatment group and 1,810 in the control group, giving 1,806 survey 
observations in the treated group (1,233/573 before/after treatment) and 8,071 observations for the 
controls (5,358/2,713 before/after treatment). There are slightly more females in the sampled households 
as well as smaller groups of individuals aged below 21 and close to retirement age – i.e., between 55 and 
60 for man, and between 50 and 55 for women.  
Note that when we focus on individual level variables we restrict our attention to working adults 
only with non-missing data on employment status (see Section 2). This reduces sample sizes 
considerably – though the proportions remain similar. Additional figures are provided in Appendix Table 
2 for individuals in the treated group with non-missing information in either their labour market 
outcomes or their satisfaction levels. Once again, we observe more females than males – and a large 
number of individuals in the working age bracket. There are again small groups of young individuals 
(16-21) and nearly retirees (above 50/55 for women/men respectively). Appendix Table 3 tabulates the 
mean of the outcome variables for individuals in these groups. We find that males are slightly more 
likely to work than females, and that non-head of household and 16-to-21 year-old individuals are the 
two groups most likely to be in employment. The head of the household is the individual reporting the 
highest level of overall income – with this largely explained by the amounts of benefits claimed. On the 
other hand, the highest level of labour income is found among the non-head of households and young 
individuals (who have the highest probability of being employed). We also find that non-head of 
household and 16-to-21 year-old individuals are the two groups reporting the highest levels of overall 
satisfaction, as well as satisfaction with health and income. On the other hand, the highest level of 
satisfaction with leisure is reported by nearly retired females.  
6. Household level analysis
6.1 Effects on the targeted outcomes: housing benefits, mobility and household structure 
We start our investigation by studying whether the policy impacted the amount that households receive 
in the form of housing benefits. Our evidence is presented in Table 2. Columns (1) to (3) show results for 
all households in our sample. Columns (4) to (6) pool all households, but single out the impact of the 
policy for families who stay/move by interacting the treatment variable (and the policy-on control) with a 
dummy identifying households that relocate. Finally, Columns (7) to (9) focus on households that do not 
move. Columns (1), (4) and (7) only include household and LA-by-year effects alongside wave and 
month dummies. Columns (2), (5) and (8) instead add interactions between household average age and 
tenure length measured before the policy was announced and the policy-on indicator. Finally, Columns 
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(3), (6) and (9) further append an interaction between the number of bedrooms per person (measured pre-
policy announcement) and the policy-on dummy.  
The first two columns show that the policy did reduce benefits by approximately £6-£7 per week. 
Given a baseline amount of housing subsidies among treated household of around £80, this is not far off 
from the expected 14% reduction mandated by the policy for anyone with one spare room. This result 
weakens somewhat in Column (3) where we add the interaction terms between the policy-on dummy and 
the number of bedrooms-per-person. However, the coefficient still reveals a negative and sizeable 
reduction of about 6% (though not significant). 
Columns (4) to (6) reveal that all of the effect is concentrated on the households who do not relocate. 
On the other hand, households that move experience an increase in housing benefits though this is not 
statistically significant. These results are further strengthened when we move to the last three columns 
that only consider households who do not relocate. In this case, we find an effect of £7-£9 pounds – even 
closer to the expected reductions implied by the policy. Note that we consider the specification of 
Column (8) as our favourite. This model controls for household and LA-by-year unobservable 
characteristics – as well as for the possibility that the imbalances in terms of average age and tenure 
length of the treated households documented in Table 1 affect their outcomes post-treatment. The 
specification reported in Column (9) is a robustness check for possible post-policy effects of baseline 
differences between treated and control households in terms of bedrooms-per-person. In this regression, 
identification of the policy effect now comes from the more nuanced aspects of the treatment group 
definition, rather than simply pre-policy bedrooms per person. Clearly, this interaction term partly 
captures the impact of the policy itself so may amount to ‘over controlling’. Nevertheless, the results in 
Columns (8) and (9) provide similar conclusions, and we will continue to report both specifications for 
comparison in subsequent tables. 
So far we have focussed on the enforcement date – i.e., we have defined as ‘policy on’ all time 
periods from April 2013. In Table 3, we study whether housing benefits actually do change in response 
to the enforcement of the policy as opposed to its announcement in April 2012. The table focuses on 
stayers where we expect to observe an effect and presents the three specifications reported in the various 
columns of Table 2. We find that the enforcement date has a slightly larger effect when controlling for 
any possible effect of the policy announcement on the treated households’ housing benefits. Using our 
favourite specification (Column 2), this impact is found to be 14.5% – i.e., almost identical to the 
expected reduction for households with one spare room. On the other hand, we find a positive but non-
significant effect of the policy announcement. This evidence is reassuring about our empirical design: we 
find a policy effect on the variable most directly impacted by the bedroom tax reform where we expect to 
find it and no effect where none should be documented. This suggests that our method enables us to 
isolate the impact of the policy – while netting out other unobservable characteristics that might 
contaminate our causal inference.  
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Table 4 examines another of the targeted outcomes of the policy: mobility. Indeed, the aim of the 
policy was at the same time to reduce the overall cost of housing welfare policies and force relocation of 
individuals with ‘too much space’ to smaller dwellings – releasing space for households in need of a 
larger home. The table clearly shows that the policy was not successful in this respect. If anything two of 
the three point estimates suggest that the policy reduced mobility – though the numbers are very close to 
zero and not significant.  
In some extensions (not tabulated), we considered the latest wave of data – with information up to 
2016 – to investigate whether the ‘bedroom tax’ might have had an impact on mobility over a longer 
horizon – but failed to find any such evidence. We therefore decided to maintain our main sampling 
framework for most of the analysis as this ensures that our results capture the causal impact of the policy 
reform by looking in close time proximity to its announcement and enforcement. We also investigated 
whether the effects on housing benefit and on mobility differed between types of social landlord. As 
discussed in Section 2, there are two general categories of landlord providing social housing in Britain –
Local Authorities and private housing associations or registered social landlords – each with different 
types of housing stock and different organisational arrangements. We found no significant differences 
between tenants in these two groups (the results are not tabulated but available from the authors). 
Tables 5 to 7 investigate whether the policy affected the structure of the household or the type of 
accommodation occupied by individuals. The first table focuses on the number of bedrooms per person. 
Note that in this case we do not estimate specifications that control for the pre-policy bedroom-per-
person × policy-on interaction. The second table instead concentrates on the number of rooms, while the 
last table studies the impact on the number of people in the household. 
The first two columns of Table 5 show that the policy had an overall small, negative effect on the 
number of bedrooms per person. As might be expected, Columns (3) and (4) show that all of this effect is 
concentrated among movers – who experience a 0.5 reduction in the number of rooms per household 
member following relocation. On the other hand, we find no changes for stayers (see Columns 5 and 6). 
Table 6 sheds further light on this finding by looking at the number of rooms in the accommodation. 
Once again, we find a small overall effect (Columns 1 to 2) that is completely explained by changes in 
accommodation size for movers. These experience almost a one-room reduction after relocating – in line 
with what expected if individuals move with the aim of complying with the policy. Taken together with 
Table 4, these results imply that although the policy did not encourage people to move, it did encourage 
people to downsize when they did move. Evidently, the policy has the potential to shift the equilibrium 
use of social housing space in the long run – as tenants move out of homes for other reasons – but these 
changes depend on the natural turnover rate and will occur at a slower rate than might have been 
intended (i.e., had the policy had an impact on mobility). 
Lastly, Table 7 looks at whether household size changes in response to the policy. We find this is 
not the case – irrespective of whether we pool all individuals or consider movers and stayers separately. 
We further investigated whether we find changes in household size when focussing only on young 
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members (age 16-21), working age adults, near retirees and very young babies – i.e., those below one 
which might have been conceived to ‘neutralize’ the policy. We also studied whether we see any change 
in the number of adults residing with the household who are not family members – and could instead be 
‘lodgers’. Irrespective of the specific groups we consider, we never detect any sizeable and significant 
effect. This suggests that anecdotal evidence and ‘media rumours’ about social tenants subletting their 
space or having children to by-pass the ‘bedroom tax’ find no empirical support in our data.  
6.2 Effects on the other outcomes: income, savings, food expenditure and deprivation 
Besides affecting housing benefit receipt, the policy could have impacted households’ income level by 
changing their labour market behaviour and/or by affecting other benefit claims. We provide some 
evidence in Table 8. The table presents results for overall weekly income (Columns 1 to 3); labour 
income (Columns 4 to 6) and benefit income (Columns 7 to 9). The latter category includes housing 
benefits but also incorporate amounts received, for example, in unemployment benefits, disability claims 
and child benefits. The sample used in the analysis considers both stayers and movers – although the 
results on stayers only are very similar (not tabulated, but available upon request). Lastly, the different 
specifications presented in the table follow the structure of the empirical models used in Table 2.  
Columns (1) to (3) show that overall weekly income falls after the policy by between £16 and £21. 
The largest point estimate (Column 1) is significant, while the one from our favourite specification 
(Column 2) is borderline significant (with a t-stat of approximately 1.4). The documented coefficients are 
twice as large as the drop we found in housing benefits (documented in Tables 2 and 3). This is 
surprising and warrants further investigation.  
To shed light on this issue, Columns (4) to (6) study changes in labour income. Although our results 
do not yield any significant effects, we find consistently negative results – of up to £13 using our 
preferred specification in Column (5). Conversely, Columns (7) to (9) suggest that the drop in housing 
benefit was the main driver of the reductions in income derived from benefits. We return to these issues 
below where we analyse individual level data to identify more precisely what behavioural responses 
might determine these labour income shortfalls. 
Next, we study whether these income reductions affect savings, consumption behaviour and material 
deprivation. Our first set of results is reported in Table 9. Columns (1) to (3) show that the policy is 
associated with a positive impact on the households’ propensity to save – of approximately 30% (using 
Column 2). However, none of the estimates is close to significance at conventional levels. Columns (4) 
to (6) instead show mixed patterns in terms of food expenditure. Using our favourite specification 
(Column 5), we find that food consumption increased by £0.5 per week – or 1%. Besides being not 
significant, the sign of this estimate is counterintuitive and its size is very small compared to the income 
reductions documented above.  
Table 10 focuses on the three measures of material deprivation – lifestyle changes, financial stress 
and durable good purchase – discussed above and the composite indicator that combines the information 
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from these three categories. Most of the estimates point in the direction of an increase in material 
deprivation – although none of the coefficients is significant at conventional levels. Focussing for 
example on the overall deprivation indicator and using our favourite specification reported in Column 
(11), the ‘bedroom tax’ is associated with a 13.7% of a standard deviation increase in material 
deprivation – though the standard error of this point estimate is 0.208 (giving rise to a t-ratio of 0.89), 
making it far from significant. 
All in all, the evidence from this section suggests that the policy implied a reduction in income for 
targeted households. This reduction was more than proportional to the housing benefit cut mandated for 
families with a spare room. On the other hand, the policy did not succeed in incentivising mobility – nor 
did it affect individuals’ consumption and saving patterns. As a result, the policy might have worsened 
households’ standard of living – although any such impact cannot be precisely estimated using the 
material deprivation proxies we consider. Given the evidence collected so far, we can only conclude that 
affected households made do with what they had and set in place other coping strategies that we cannot 
measure given the data at hand. The policy was however successful in some its goals: housing benefits 
were reduced for movers and stayers, and under-occupying tenants who moved – and would have moved 
without the policy – shifted to smaller accommodation. 
6.3 ‘Event studies’ policy estimates 
In this section, we present some ‘event studies’ policy estimates focussing on the following household 
level outcomes: housing benefits; mobility; overall income; labour income; income from benefits; 
savings; and food expenditure. Our results are presented in Figure 1. These show point estimates and 
associated 90% confidence intervals of the effect of the ‘bedroom tax’ spanning several quarters before 
and after its enforcement. The omitted period against which all outcomes are benchmarked is centred on 
five quarters before the policy came into force – in April 2013. This also corresponds to one quarter prior 
to the policy announcement in April 2012. The aim of the figure is twofold. First, it allows us to 
investigate whether there are significant pre-trends in most of the outcomes we have considered. Second, 
it allows us to investigate whether any significant impact on our variables of interest takes time to 
materialise and/or occurs at a specific time/quarter. 
Starting from the top-left corner, we find that the policy had a significant effect on housing benefits 
in three out of the six quarters following its enforcement – i.e., quarter two, three and five. Two of the 
other three quarters are negative – though not significant – while the remaining one is very close to zero. 
Interestingly, we also observe an inflection one and two quarters before the enforcement – i.e., three and 
four quarters after the announcement – although these estimates are not significant. Overall, this evidence 
confirms the insights gathered from Table 3 where we compared the impact of enforcement and 
announcement on changes in housing benefits – and found that only the former mattered. The top right 
corner instead focuses on mobility and confirms our previous evidence: the policy did not significantly 
affected households’ propensity to move. 
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The next three plots focus on income. Consistently with the evidence presented in Table 8, we find 
an overall income reduction – which is predominantly linked to a decrease in the amount of benefits but 
further amplified by a decline in labour income. The most negative estimates occur two and three 
quarters after the policy enforcement – although none of them is statistically significant. We also find 
some evidence of a drop in income from benefits – matched by a corresponding drop in overall income – 
one quarter before the policy was enforced. This estimate is not significant and could simply be driven 
by random fluctuations in the outcome variable over time.  
Lastly we focus on savings and food expenditure. Once again we find no evidence of any significant 
effect following the policy or of any substantial pre-trends in these variables. These results are consistent 
with the findings in Table 9.
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6.4 Geographical heterogeneity 
To conclude this section, we study whether our results are heterogeneous along several geographical 
dimensions. In particular, we investigate the following margins. First, we consider households living in 
urban areas as opposed to rural ones (168 and 30 treated households, respectively).
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 Next, we study 
households living in London vs. the rest of the country (29 vs. 160 treated units, respectively). Finally, 
we consider households living in areas where housing costs are above/below the median of the sample. 
We proxy for these using local reference rents (LRR) for broad rental market areas (BMRAs) in England 
(not available in Wales) measured in March 2012.
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 LLR are used in conjunctions with a person’s 
BMRA of residence to calculate local housing allowances (LHA) that anchor the subsidies that can be 
claimed by households on benefits renting private accommodations. As discussed in Section 2, these 
households are not subject to the ‘bedroom tax’ – which only affects benefit claimants who rent 
accommodations from LAs and social landlords whose benefits/rents are calculated using a different 
approach (also detailed in Section 2). Unfortunately, detailed and consistent information on the levels of 
social housing rents in different areas of the country is not available for the years around the 
announcement and enforcement of the ‘bedroom tax’. However, the two measures are likely to be very 
highly correlated as they are both benchmarked against the cost of private housing. 
19 The last plot in Figure 1 refers to the probability of having a job. We discuss to this graph in the next section. 
20 In order to classify areas as urban/rural, we use the standard Office for National Statistics (ONS) definition. This 
identifies those settlements with a population of 10,000 or more as urban areas and rural areas otherwise. We use 
this to classify whether a household lives in an urban/rural area using the exact coordinate of a family’s address.  
21 There are 154 BRMA in England. For each BRMA, reference rents are posted for accommodations with different 
room numbers (one to five, and then six or above). We consider rents prevailing in the BMRA averaged across all 
accommodation types. 
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Broadly speaking, we find no evidence of striking and significant heterogeneity. However, some 
patterns are worth discussing.
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 Starting with the urban/rural divide, we find that the negative effect on 
housing benefits is mainly concentrated in urban areas – at around £8 – while the effect in rural areas is 
as low as £2. Note however the two estimates are not statistically different, and the rural sample size is 
small. Furthermore, we find no evidence of differential impact on mobility but some heterogeneity in the 
effect of the policy on overall income: while this drops by up to £50 in rural areas, it only decreases by 
£15 in urban areas. This difference seems to be mainly driven by a more significant drop in labour 
income in rural areas (approx. £31) than in urban ones (less than £10) – still implying an overall negative 
(and somewhat puzzling) negative labour supply response to the policy. Once again, while interesting, 
these differences are not statistically significant. Lastly, we find that overall levels of deprivation 
increase more substantially in rural areas (0.26 of a standard deviation) than in urban ones (0.12 of a 
standard deviation), but this heterogeneity is not significant.  
When we explore the London vs. the rest of the country, we reproduce the patterns found for the 
urban/rural divide: benefits drop by more substantial amounts in London (£15 vs. £5) but mobility is still 
unaffected across the board. We also find that overall income drops more substantially out of London 
than in the capital, and that this differential response is driven by heterogeneity in the effect of the 
‘bedroom tax’ on labour income (down by £20 and £5 out of London and in the capital, respectively). 
Finally, we still find an overall negative (insignificant) impact on deprivation though this is smaller in 
London. Once again, while these patterns are interesting, none of the differences is significant and the 
London sample size is small.
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Next, we study heterogeneity in areas with above/below median housing costs as captured by the 
LLRs. The median LLR in our sample is £135 while the average is £170 – substantially higher than the 
average housing benefit (at £80) in the sample. As discussed, LLR are used to calculate LHA that anchor 
the benefits of recipients renting from private landlords. Rents are higher in the private sector than in 
social housing – so this difference is expected. However, relative to national figures, our descriptive 
statistics are skewed towards higher LLRs for two reasons: a- we are considering the average LLR in the 
BRMA across all accommodation types – irrespective of their number of rooms and without weighting 
more common (smaller) properties more than other less frequent (bigger) property types; and b- given 
the US sampling and our data restrictions, we are using a set of households skewed towards urban, more 
expensive area. In relation to the latter, the median/average LLR in urban areas is £140/£175 – further 
climbing to £240/£260 in London – while in rural areas the corresponding figures are both £130. 
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 All the findings summarised above come from our favourite specification that includes all layers of fixed effects, 
LA-by-year dummies and interactions between household characteristics and the post-policy period – except for the 
interaction with the number of bedrooms per person. 
23 We also study whether there are heterogeneous effects along the city size dimension. We proxy for the latter by 
considering the 2011 population of the built-up urban area in which a household resides. Built-up areas are defined 
as land which is ‘irreversibly urban in character’, meaning that they are characteristic of a town or city.  While we 
fail to find any significant heterogeneity, the overall patterns are similar to those documented along the urban/rural 
and London-vs.-the rest dimensions. 
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Our results show that the negative effect of the ‘bedroom tax’ on housing benefits is concentrated in 
areas with LLRs above median – at £13 – whereas BRMAs with below median housing costs experience 
a reduction in housing benefits of only £3. However, this heterogeneity is not statistically significant. We 
still find no heterogeneity in the mobility response and some evidence that overall and labour income fall 
more in areas with below median LLRs. For example, we find that labour earnings are £2.5 lower in 
BMRAs with above median housing costs and £16 in areas with below-median LLRs. Correspondingly, 
overall deprivation is higher in areas with lower LLRs. Once again, none of these differences is 
statistically significant. However, these patterns mirror those we found for the urban/rural divide and 
London/rest-of-the-country margin. 
We also studied whether there is some within-city variation. To do so, we characterised every 
household’s residential location by the distance to the closest city centre. The latter is measured as (log 
of) metres away from the population centroid of the nearest 10,000 inhabitants’ build-up area and is 
meant to capture the most accessible employment cluster. Our results show that the ‘bedroom tax’ had a 
positive impact on housing benefits and overall/labour income in areas closest to the city centre with a 
fairly steep spatial decline. For example, the impact on housing benefits is positive at £35 at log-distance 
zero (i.e., one meter from the centre) – but declines rapidly by approximately £5 for one standard 
deviation increase in the log-distance. At the average distance level, the impact on housing benefits is 
negative at £7.75 – very close to the headline figures in Table 2. It should once again be noticed that 
neither the main effect of the ‘bedroom tax’ nor its interaction with log-distance are significant – so our 
results are not conclusive. On the other hand, we find no consistent patterns of heterogeneity on mobility 
and some evidence that material deprivation increases closer to city centres than in more peripheral areas 
– though once again these patterns are not significant.
7. Individual level analysis
7.1 Effects on the probability of working 
We begin our investigation of individual level outcomes by studying whether the policy had an effect on 
the probability that individuals have a job. Our first set of results is reported in Table 11. For simplicity, 
we only present the coefficients that come from our preferred specification (i.e., the one including LA-
by-year effects and post-policy interaction with household characteristics except bedroom per person). 
The first column pools all individuals, whereas the subsequent columns single out the impact of the 
policy on the employment of the following subgroups: heads of household, female members of the 
households, individuals aged 16 to 21 and nearly retirees, i.e. males age 55-60 and women aged 50-55. 
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Starting from the first column, we find no evidence that the policy changed individuals’ propensity 
to work.
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 This pattern is confirmed in the bottom-right plot of Figure 1 where we present ‘event studies’ 
estimates of the policy on this outcome: most of the estimates of the policy effect are small and close to 
zero following its enforcement in April 2013. Similarly, we find no discernible effects after the policy 
announcement a year earlier.  
Some patterns emerge when we study the variation in the policy effect among different household 
members. The point estimate in Column (2)shows that heads of household have a lower probability of 
working following the policy enforcement. Although this estimate is not significant at conventional level, 
the magnitude is quite sizeable – implying a 15%-20% reduction in the likelihood of having a job. 
Column (3) further documents a negative and significant effect on the probability that female members 
of the households have a job – corresponding to approximately a 40% decrease in the likelihood of 
working. Finally, we find a reduction in the probability of holding a job for young individuals aged 16-
to-21 and a positive but small impact on near retirees. None of the effects is statistically significant.  
Given the small sample sizes involved in our analysis, it is legitimate to ask whether we lack 
statistical power to detect any significant effect. To shed light on this issue, one can carry out the 
following calculations. First, assume that treatment is as ‘good as random’ and that the two groups have 
identical pre-policy mean outcomes – i.e., for both individuals in treated and non-treated households the 
baseline probability of having a job is approximately 0.25. This gives a variance of 0.187 (i.e., (0.25) × 
(1-0.25)) and a standard deviation of 0.43. Second, consider we are working with changes in employment 
given our difference-in-difference methodology and that we have approximately a ratio of treated-to-
control of 0.29. The variance of the change in outcome can be written as 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑃𝑟𝑒) =
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡) + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑃𝑟𝑒) − 2𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡, 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑃𝑟𝑒). Given our sample size and assuming
a power of 0.80 (as standard in the practice), this means we need the standard deviation of the change in 
employment pre/post policy to be 0.29 (i.e., a variance of 0.083) if we want to detect an effect of 0.05 
with 10% significance level. Rearranging the formula above, we can reformulate this in terms of 
covariance of outcomes before and after the bedroom tax, i.e.: 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 , 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑃𝑟𝑒) = [(𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡) + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑃𝑟𝑒)
−𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑃𝑟𝑒)]/2
Using the numbers discussed above, this means 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡, 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑃𝑟𝑒) needs to be 0.147. By
further dividing this expression by the variance of 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑃𝑟𝑒 (at 0.187), this can be interpreted as the
required regression coefficient of post-policy employment probability on the pre-policy likelihood of 
working that would allow us to estimate a 10% significant 0.05 employment effect given sample size. 
This approach yields a ‘target’ regression coefficient of 0.78, which we are able to confront with the 
actual coefficients we find when regressing post ‘bedroom tax’ employment outcomes on the 
24 We also looked at the distinction between full-time vs. part-time employment, and the ‘intensive’ margin – i.e., 
the number of hours worked, conditional on working but found no evidence that these outcomes are affected by the 
policy. 
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corresponding pre-policy variables. Our investigations provide reassuring evidence: the coefficient on 
the lagged-dependent variable is always in the region of 0.65-0.70 (depending on the controls we include 
in our analysis and on whether we focus on non-treated individuals or also include members of treated 
households), with 95% confidence intervals confidence level clearly covering the 0.75-0.78 area. This is 
true for both the employment variable discussed in this section, as well as the income variables which we 
study next. In short, this suggests that – despite the fairly limited sample sizes – our analysis has 
relatively strong power given the persistence of outcomes across the policy enforcement date.   
We continue our investigation in Table 12 where we study whether the impact of the policy varies 
depending on the household’s income prior to the ‘bedroom tax’ announcement. To do so, we create 
three dummy variables that identify whether the family had earnings (i.e., labour market income) below 
the sample median; in the bottom quartile of the sample distribution; and in the top quartile of the sample 
distribution. Our evidence shows that the broadly negative effects documents in Table 11 are all 
concentrated among families in the bottom half or bottom quartile of the earning distribution. While not 
significant, these estimates are sizeable and imply a reduction to almost zero in the labour market 
participation of individuals in these households.  
Although these findings need to be interpreted with caution – especially given the small sample 
sizes – they are consistent with some perverse incentives created by the ‘bedroom tax’ in interaction with 
other aspects of the welfare system. In particular, earnings beyond a certain threshold trigger a reduction 
in the amount of housing benefits that a family is entitled to. This occurs because of deductions made to 
the housing benefits when the claimants earn more than a given weekly personal allowance (e.g., £160 
approximately for a single under 65) or because of deductions made when non-dependant members of 
the household have income in varying earning brackets (e.g., a non-dependent household member aged 
above 18, working at least 16 hours per week and earning less than £136 entails a benefit reduction of 
nearly £15 per week; figures updated to April 2017). It is thus possible that individuals in the low-to-
middling part of the labour income distribution – where these incentives are likely to be the strongest – 
might have reduced their labour market activities to neutralize, at least in part, the negative effect of the 
‘bedroom tax’ policy.  
Unfortunately, given the limited sample size of the US data, we are not in a position to investigate 
this issue further by exploiting the non-linearities in the incentives provided by the ‘spare room’ policy in 
interaction with these other aspects of the housing welfare programme.  
7.2 Effects on income from different sources 
Table 13 studies the effect of the policy on individuals’ weekly income by focussing on overall income – 
Columns (1) to (5) – labour income – Columns (6) to (10) – and income derived from social benefits – 
Columns (11) to (15). The table has the same structure as Table 11 and investigates the effect of the 
policy by first pooling all individuals and then by singling out the impact for household members with 
difference characteristics. 
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Starting with Columns (1) to (5), we find a £12 reduction in average weekly income, increasing to 
£20 when focussing on the head-of-household. Although this point estimate is not significant, its size is 
consistent with the evidence provided in Table 8: overall household income decreases by around £16-£21. 
This is likely due to a loss of housing benefits – mainly claimed by the head-of-household – coupled with 
female household members also reducing their workforce activities. Consistently, we find that the overall 
income of women in the treated households decreases (by up to £12; not significant). This is in part 
compensated by a positive effect on the income of young household members of £11 (not significant). 
Furthermore, the income of near retirees also increases by a similar extent (£9). 
We investigate these issues in more detail in Columns (6) to (10) and (11) to (15) where we focus 
on labour and benefits income, respectively. As in Columns (1) to (5), none of our estimates is 
significant – but the patterns are instructive and relatively consistent with the findings discussed above. 
Starting from Columns (6) to (10), we find both heads of household and women experience relatively 
sizeable labour income drops (of up to £8 and £11, approximately). This is consistent with our previous 
findings showing that they are the two groups most likely to reduce their labour supply following the 
policy. Conversely, the young increase their weekly labour income by up to £14. We also find that near 
retirees earn less from labour income – although previous findings suggested that the policy modestly 
increase their work probability.  
Columns (11) to (15) further show that head-of-households experience a loss in income from 
benefits of approximately £12. This is consistent with the drop reported in Table 8 and justified by the 
fact that household heads are most likely the family members claiming household-level benefits – 
especially the housing benefits targeted by the policy, but also other benefits disbursed at the household 
level (e.g., child benefits). We also see a small increase in the amount of benefits received by women and 
a fairly substantial drop in the benefits received by young individuals. Finally, near retirees seem to 
increase the amount of weekly income derived from benefits. Coupled with the result documented on the 
labour income and employment participation for this group, this pattern suggest that near retirees might 
be at the same time anticipating retirement – and thus claiming a pension – and possibly finding some 
small jobs – paying less than their previous employment. Unfortunately, given our small sample size, this 
conjecture remains speculative and we cannot dig deeper into this finding. 
7.3 Effects on satisfaction 
We present our results in Table 14. This focuses on four different outcomes. The first column studies the 
impact of the policy on satisfaction with an individual’s own health. Column (2) focuses on satisfaction 
with income, while Column (3) investigates possible effects on satisfaction with the amount of leisure 
time. Finally, the last column focuses on overall life satisfaction. Across all columns smaller values 
correspond to lower levels of satisfaction. 
Column (1) shows that the policy may have lowered satisfaction with health, although this estimate is 
not statistically significant and the implied magnitude is small. Column (2) similarly shows that the 
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policy negatively affected satisfaction with income. However, in this case the coefficient shows a 
relatively sizeable effect – although still not statistically significant – implying up to a 10% decrease 
from the mean income satisfaction. Column (3) conversely shows that satisfaction with leisure time 
increased following the enforcement of the bedroom tax reform – but once again the point estimate is far 
from being precisely estimated. Lastly, Column (4) shows that overall life satisfaction was not clearly 
altered following the policy change. This suggests that the decrease in satisfaction with income was 
evened out by the small increase in satisfaction with leisure time. 
In some extensions to this analysis, we further studied whether the impact of the policy on overall life 
satisfaction is heterogeneous among the different household members considered above. Our results are 
not tabulated for space reasons. Overall, we failed to find systematic and significant patterns. However, 
our estimates pointed in the direction of more negative effects on the life satisfaction of young family 
members, and slightly positive effects for heads of households. Though highly speculative, a possible 
interpretation of these results is that they are mediated by individuals’ labour market participations: the 
group with improving well-being – household heads – is the one more likely to reduce work activities 
following the policy implementation. Conversely, the group more likely to increase labour supply – i.e., 
young individuals – is also the one experiencing the largest drop in satisfaction. Unfortunately, given the 
data at hand, we are not in a position to study this possible link more directly.
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8. Concluding remarks
We have studied the impact of an under-occupancy penalty policy – nick-named the ‘bedroom tax’ – 
aimed at reducing the burden of housing subsidies in the UK by rationing social tenants’ use of space. 
Our study is the first to present an evaluation of this reform using a difference-in-difference methodology 
and considering a broad range of outcomes.  
In a nutshell, we find that the policy reduced housing benefits among treated households as expected. 
These households experienced further losses in overall income, stemming from changes to income from 
labour and other benefit sources, and from small changes in labour market participation of some 
household members. Although the policy was not successful in encouraging residential moves, it did 
incentivise people who moved to downsize. We also find that the policy did not significantly affect 
households’ food consumption, savings. Similarly, although the reform worsened households’ levels of 
material deprivation, this effect was not statistically significant or sizeable. Finally, we find a negative 
impact on individuals’ overall life satisfaction – mainly stemming from reduced satisfaction with income 
levels – which is however imprecisely estimated. 
Although not very conclusive, our results allow us to comment on a number of issues raised in 
relation to the ‘bedroom tax’. First and foremost, one concern with this policy was that – by forcing 
25 We also studied hetereogeneity in satisfaction along the three other specific domains (i.e., health, income and 
leisure time). Once again, we failed to find any significant and systematic pattern. 
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people to move – the initiative would hollow out communities, increase neighbourhood turnover, deprive 
poor children of a stable learning environment (with possible detrimental effects on their education, see 
Gibbons et al 2017) and push individuals already at the risk of being detached from the labour market to 
areas with even fewer employment opportunities. Our findings that the policy did not significantly affect 
individuals’ mobility allay this concern. This reluctance to move, due to family and community ties, is 
also documented in a small scale qualitative study of families in Manchester (Bragg et al 2015). Clearly, 
however, this evidence also suggests that the policy was only partly successful in one of its stated aims – 
namely, rationalising the use of publicly-funded housing and addressing the problem of over-occupied 
and under-occupied dwellings co-existing in the system because of problems with (un-)coordinated 
allocation and mobility costs. Although the policy didn’t encourage moves, it did encourage movers to 
downsize, so in the long run under-occupancy of social housing might be reduced. This change will 
however only occur in conjunction with natural turnover occupants of social housing 
Our evidence also gives some credence to critics of the policy who argued that it would further strain 
the finances and standards of living of already worse-off individuals – without generating any benefits 
besides a reduction in the amount of public spending devoted to housing subsidies. While our estimates 
are too imprecise to be fully confident, their flavour is in line with the qualitative work by Moffatt et al. 
(2016) who argue that policy had adverse effects on households’ poverty, wellbeing and health.  
A cruder interpretation would suggest that the policy was a success. According to official estimates it 
saved around £500 million in housing-benefit spending per year in the first three years following its 
implementation. 
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 Given our findings, this happened without significantly (from a statistical point of 
view) affecting people’s behaviour and livelihood.  
A more agnostic interpretation of our results is that the only sizeable and significant effect was a 
reduction of individuals’ housing benefits roughly corresponding to the policy-mandated reduction for 
individuals with a spare room. Given the low baseline income of households affected by the change, this 
represents a non-negligible amount – at approximately 3.5% of the weekly overall income.  
What seems puzzling is the lack of evidence on any other significant margins of adjustment in 
response to this income shortfall. Our results should then be taken as the first attempt at providing a 
causal evaluation of a peculiar policy whose effects have yet to be understood. 
26 Figures on the projected savings were published by the Government following a ‘Freedom of Information’ 
request. These show estimated savings of £490 million, £525 million and £560 millon in 2013/14, 2014/15 and 
2105/16, respectively. See document posted at the following address: 
https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/how_much_has_the_government_save 
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Tables 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and balancing tests before the reform 
Treatments Controls Difference 
Difference 
(conditional 
on fixed effects) 
Household Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Average age 198 35.49 13.20 620 26.16 12.58 9.331*** 11.69*** 
Tenure length 177 10.75 9.568 552 7.786 6.920 2.972*** 3.330*** 
Bedrooms per person 198 1.590 0.720 620 0.805 0.295 0.784*** 0.838*** 
Number of bedrooms 198 2.752 0.679 620 2.119 0.843 0.633*** 0.587*** 
Number of people 198 2.151 1.203 620 3.003 1.669 -0.851*** -0.977*** 
Mobility 198 0.060 0.239 620 0.072 0.260 -0.011 -0.034 
Overall income 198 316.57 160.64 620 347.02 158.79 -30.44** -15.48 
Labour income 187 40.84 85.15 588 43.74 87.18 -2.90 6.366 
Social benefits 198 268.76 123.04 620 295.44 136.75 -26.68** -23.13 
Housing benefits amount 198 79.36 34.45 620 82.27 36.59 -2.909 6.491 
Household saves money 198 0.161 0.369 620 0.151 0.357 0.010 0.052 
Food expenditure 196 48.21 28.09 615 60.83 40.70 -12.62*** -9.834** 
Lifestyle changes 88 1.282 1.193 311 1.430 1.055 -0.147 -0.096 
Financial stress 197 0.969 1.969 616 1.109 2.197 -0.139 -0.154 
Durable goods purchase 197 -0.468 0.919 616 -0.549 0.975 0.081 -0.127 
Overall material 
deprivation 88 1.174 1.142 310 1.304 1.063 -0.129 -0.008 
Individual 
Working 293 0.225 0.418 994 0.233 0.423 -0.008 -0.030 
Overall income 293 209.40 143.89 994 213.30 166.59 -3.897 -4.551 
Labour income 280 24.69 57.37 937 26.61 66.59 -1.923 2.946 
Social benefits 293 179.80 135.33 994 182.27 156.18 -2.462 -10.59 
Satisfaction with health 233 3.480 1.918 793 4.137 1.866 -0.656*** -0.906*** 
Satisfaction with income 233 3.012 1.685 792 3.358 1.702 -0.345*** -0.346* 
Satisfaction with amount 
of leisure 232 4.012 1.701 790 4.208 1.629 -0.195 -0.300 
Overall life satisfaction  233 3.836 1.831 792 4.248 1.772 -0.411*** -0.622*** 
Note: *: significant at 10% level; **: significant at 5% level; ***: significant at 1% level. 
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Table 2.  Housing benefits (£/week) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Post*Treat -6.233** -7.525** -4.753 -6.323* -7.392** -4.239 -7.645** -9.164** -8.054* 
(2.994) (3.427) (4.025) (3.243) (3.724) (4.318) (3.364) (3.954) (4.740) 
Post 0.809 -3.952 -2.004 0.441 -5.420 -3.310 1.729 -5.782 -5.069 
(3.885) (5.488) (5.619) (3.880) (5.530) (5.616) (4.314) (5.854) (5.953) 
Post*Treat*Movers 1.234 -0.969 -0.378 
(8.194) (8.864) (8.625) 
Post*Movers 2.184 4.941 5.545 
(4.948) (5.393) (5.401) 
Sample All All All All All All Stayers Stayers Stayers 
Beds./person*Post N N Y N N Y N N Y 
Age*Post N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y 
Tenure*Post N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y 
Household FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Wave FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
LA*Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations  3,781 3,431 3,431 3,781 3,431 3,431 3,088 2,793 2,793 
R-squared 0.767 0.769 0.770 0.767 0.770 0.770 0.775 0.777 0.777 
Note: Table reports regression coefficients and standard errors. Standard errors clustered at the household level. *: significant at 10% level; **: 
significant at 5% level; ***: significant at 1% level. ‘Treat’ is an indicator that household is affected by the ‘bedroom tax’ policy in that they would 
be deemed to have had a spare room at the time of the policy announcement in April 2012. ‘Post’ is an indicator for the pre-post April 2013 period 
when policy enacted. ‘Beds./person’ is number of bedrooms per person. ‘Movers’ is an indicator that the household moved residential address at 
some point over the policy-on period. ‘Age’ refers to average age of household members. ‘Tenure’ is length of tenure in current accommodation pre-
policy. ‘Household FE’ refers to household fixed effects. ‘Wave FE’ refers to dummies for US survey waves. ‘LA x Year FE’ are interactions 
between LA and Year identifiers. ‘Month FE’ is a series of dummies for the year-month the household is surveyed. 
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Table 3. Housing benefits – Announcement and Enforcement 
(1) (2) (3) 
Enforcement*Treat -11.06*** -11.81** -11.11** 
(4.265) (4.869) (5.640) 
Announcement *Treat 5.313 5.850 7.731 
(3.900) (4.512) (6.098) 
Enforcement 2.194 -8.953 -8.403 
(4.527) (6.681) (6.666) 
Announcement -4.456 -0.709 0.634 
(4.711) (6.478) (6.789) 
Sample Stayers Stayers Stayers 
Beds./person* Enforcement N N Y 
Age* Enforcement N Y Y 
Tenure* Enforcement N Y Y 
Beds./person* Announcement N N Y 
Age* Announcement N Y Y 
Tenure* Announcement N Y Y 
Household FE Y Y Y 
Wave FE Y Y Y 
LA*Year FE Y Y Y 
Month FE Y Y Y 
Observations  3,088 2,756 2,756 
R-squared 0.776 0.782 0.782 
Note: Table reports regression coefficients and standard errors. Standard errors clustered at the household level. *: significant at 10% level; 
**: significant at 5% level; ***: significant at 1% level. Enforcement is an indicator of pre-post policy enforcement (April 2013). 
Announcement is an indicator of pre-post policy announcement (April 2012). For other notes see Table 2. 
Table 4. Mobility 
(1) (2) (3) 
Post*Treat 0.007 0.005 -0.033 
(0.033) (0.037) (0.048) 
Post 0.038 0.055 0.028 
(0.048) (0.065) (0.067) 
Sample All All All 
Beds./person*Post N N Y 
Age*Post N Y Y 
Tenure*Post N Y Y 
Household FE Y Y Y 
Wave FE Y Y Y 
LA*Year FE Y Y Y 
Month FE Y Y Y 
Observations  3,781 3,431 3,431 
R-squared 0.559 0.579 0.580 
Note: Table reports regression coefficients and standard errors. Standard errors clustered at the household level. *: significant at 10% level; 
**: significant at 5% level; ***: significant at 1% level. For other notes see Table 2. 
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Table 5. Bedrooms per person 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Post*Treat -0.102** -0.098* -0.026 -0.024 -0.019 -0.023 
(0.051) (0.052) (0.044) (0.052) (0.046) (0.055) 
Post 0.057 0.036 0.053 0.023 0.056* 0.004 
(0.036) (0.065) (0.036) (0.063) (0.032) (0.051) 
Post*Treat*Movers -0.484*** -0.477*** 
(0.163) (0.163) 
Post*Movers 0.016 0.024 
(0.040) (0.045) 
Sample All All All All Stayers Stayers 
Age*Post N Y N Y N Y 
Tenure*Post N Y N Y N Y 
Household FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Wave FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
LA*Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 3,781 3,431 3,781 3,431 3,088 2,793 
R-squared 0.925 0.919 0.929 0.923 0.942 0.937 
Note: Table reports regression coefficients and standard errors. Standard errors clustered at the household level. *: significant at 10% level; 
**: significant at 5% level; ***: significant at 1% level. For other notes see Table 2. 
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Table 6. Number of bedrooms 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Post*Treat -0.181*** -0.139*** -0.091* -0.018 0.004 0.051 0.005 0.014 0.009 
(0.047) (0.041) (0.053) (0.022) (0.028) (0.045) (0.010) (0.015) (0.022) 
Post 0.011 0.118 0.151* -0.050 0.001 0.032 -0.013 0.001 -0.001 
(0.044) (0.078) (0.091) (0.043) (0.070) (0.078) (0.010) (0.017) (0.019) 
Post*Treat*Movers -0.955*** -0.935*** -0.927*** 
(0.202) (0.207) (0.199) 
Post*Movers 0.351*** 0.357*** 0.366*** 
(0.079) (0.088) (0.089) 
Sample All All All All All All Stayers Stayers Stayers 
Beds./person*Post N N Y N N Y N N Y 
Age*Post N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y 
Tenure*Post N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y 
Household FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Wave FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
LA*Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 3,781 3,431 3,431 3,781 3,431 3,431 3,088 2,793 2,793 
R-squared 0.971 0.971 0.971 0.975 0.975 0.975 0.995 0.995 0.995 
Note: Table reports regression coefficients and standard errors. Standard errors clustered at the household level. *: significant at 10% level; **: significant at 5% level; ***: significant at 1% level. 
For other notes see Table 2. 
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Table 7. Number of people 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Post*Treat -0.054 0.061 0.093 0.001 0.086 0.132 0.015 0.085 0.127 
(0.065) (0.075) (0.097) (0.068) (0.080) (0.099) (0.068) (0.083) (0.112) 
Post -0.107 0.127 0.149 -0.155** 0.058 0.088 -0.121* 0.078 0.106 
(0.065) (0.094) (0.097) (0.065) (0.094) (0.098) (0.069) (0.109) (0.115) 
Post*Treat*Movers -0.284 -0.163 -0.155 
(0.205) (0.208) (0.205) 
Post*Movers 0.277*** 0.225** 0.234** 
(0.094) (0.093) (0.093) 
Sample All All All All All All Stayers Stayers Stayers 
Beds./person*Post N N Y N N Y N N Y 
Age*Post N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y 
Tenure*Post N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y 
Household FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Wave FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
LA*Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations  3,781 3,431 3,431 3,781 3,431 3,431 3,088 2,793 2,793 
R-squared 0.967 0.969 0.969 0.968 0.970 0.970 0.972 0.974 0.974 
Note: Table reports regression coefficients and standard errors. Standard errors clustered at the household level. *: significant at 10% level; **: significant at 5% level; ***: significant at 1% level. 
For other notes see Table 2. 
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Table 8. Sources of income – overall sample 
Overall Income (£/week) Labour income (£/week) Benefits income (£/week) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Post*Treat -21.22* -19.95 -16.48 -15.73 -13.21 -4.299 -8.532 -9.731 -7.796 
(12.84) (14.59) (17.67) (10.16) (11.61) (14.45) (11.08) (12.89) (16.34) 
Post 13.61 30.41 32.84 10.12 12.73 18.85 12.96 30.14* 31.49* 
(17.02) (21.77) (22.84) (9.367) (12.46) (14.00) (12.84) (17.08) (17.79) 
Sample All All All All All All All All All 
Beds./person*Post N N Y N N Y N N Y 
Age*Post N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y 
Tenure*Post N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y 
Household FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Wave FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
LA*Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations  3,781 3,431 3,431 3,598 3,255 3,255 3,781 3,431 3,431 
R-squared 0.795 0.800 0.800 0.787 0.798 0.798 0.814 0.816 0.816 
Note:  Table reports regression coefficients and standard errors. Standard errors clustered at the household level. *: significant at 10% 
level; **: significant at 5% level; ***: significant at 1% level. For other notes see Table 2. 
Table 9. Saving and expenditure patterns – overall sample 
Household saves Food expenditure (£/week) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Post*Treat 0.014 0.046 0.042 -1.083 0.583 2.991 
(0.039) (0.046) (0.052) (2.796) (3.364) (4.333) 
Post -0.104 -0.066 -0.069 -2.606 2.178 3.909 
(0.057) (0.077) (0.078) (3.192) (5.047) (5.372) 
Sample All All All All All All 
Beds./person*Post N N Y N N Y 
Age*Post N Y Y N Y Y 
Tenure*Post N Y Y N Y Y 
Household FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Wave FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
LA*Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations  3,781 3,431 3,431 3,752 3,405 3,405 
R-squared 0.632 0.637 0.637 0.823 0.829 0.829 
Note: Table reports regression coefficients and standard errors. Standard errors clustered at the household level. *: significant at 10% 
level; **: significant at 5% level; ***: significant at 1% level. For other notes see Table 2. 
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Table 10. Material deprivation 
Lifestyle changes Financial stress Durable goods purchase Overall 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Post*Treat 0.143 0.031 -0.172 0.167 0.159 -0.129 -0.102 -0.056 -0.098 0.204 0.137 0.067 
(0.228) (0.257) (0.307) (0.234) (0.269) (0.338) (0.079) (0.088) (0.105) (0.176) (0.205) (0.258) 
Post 0.093 -0.139 -0.283 -0.061 -0.222 -0.425 -0.051 0.039 0.009 0.037 -0.123 -0.172 
(0.334) (0.416) (0.437) (0.312) (0.429) (0.444) (0.106) (0.142) (0.148) (0.308) (0.384) (0.403) 
Sample US-All US-All US-All US-All US-All US-All US-All US-All US-All US-All US-All US-All 
Beds./person*Post N N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y 
Age*Post N N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y 
Tenure*Post N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y 
Household  FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Wave FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
LA*Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 2,318 2,124 2,124 3,779 3,429 3,429 3,768 3,420 3,420 2,310 2,118 2,118 
R-squared 0.790 0.793 0.794 0.662 0.666 0.667 0.835 0.838 0.838 0.857 0.860 0.860 
Note: Table reports regression coefficients and standard errors. Standard errors clustered at the household level. *: significant at 10% level; **: significant at 5% level; ***: significant at 1% level. 
For other notes see Table 2. In all columns, the dependent variables have been standardized. See main text for a description of the various indicators used to construct the material deprivation 
outcomes. More positive values of overall material deprivation, lifestyle changes and financial stress correspond to worse outcomes. More positive values of durable good purchase correspond to 
better outcomes.. 
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Table 11. Have a job – Overall sample and by individual background 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Post*Treat -0.008 0.006 0.047 0.0000 -0.009 
(0.033) (0.057) (0.044) (0.034) (0.037) 
Post 0.012 0.026 0.009 -0.011 0.0007 
(0.044) (0.050) (0.053) (0.046) (0.046) 
Post*Treat*Head -0.020 
(0.066) 
Post*Head -0.023 
(0.032) 
Post*Treat*Female -0.097* 
(0.056) 
Post*Female 0.013 
(0.032) 
Post*Treat*21years -0.011 
(0.096) 
Post*21years 0.102** 
(0.044) 
Post*Treat* 50/55 years 0.023 
(0.095) 
Post*50/55 years -0.009 
(0.037) 
Sample All All All All All 
Bedrooms/person*Post N N N N N 
Age*Post Y Y Y Y Y 
Tenure*Post Y Y Y Y Y 
Individual FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Wave FE Y Y Y Y Y 
LA*Year FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Month FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations  5,326 5,326 5,326 5,326 5,326 
R-squared 0.751 0.752 0.752 0.753 0.752 
Note:  Table reports regression coefficients and standard errors. Standard errors clustered at the household level. *: significant at 10% 
level; **: significant at 5% level; ***: significant at 1% level. ‘Head’ is an indicator that individual is head of household. ‘Female’ is an 
indicator that the individual is female. ‘21 years’ is an indicator that the individual is 16-21 years of age. ‘50/55’ is an indicator that a male 
individual is aged 55 plus and a female individual is aged 50 plus.  For other notes see Table 2. 
36 
Table 12. Have a job – Interactions with previous earnings 
(1) (2) (3) 
Post*Treat 0.005 -0.047 -0.081 
(0.139) (0.116) (0.139) 
Post -0.352 -0.281 -0.271 
(0.230) (0.209) (0.208) 
Post*Treat* Below median -0.213 
(0.220) 
Post*Below median 0.141 
(0.103) 
Post*Treat* Bottom quartile -0.206 
(0.314) 
Post*Bottom quartile -0.005 
(0.143) 
Post*Treat* Top quartile -0.030 
(0.180) 
Post*Top quartile 0.012 
(0.097) 
Sample All All All 
Beds./person*Post N N N 
Age*Post Y Y Y 
Tenure*Post Y Y Y 
Individual FE Y Y Y 
Wave FE Y Y Y 
LA*Year FE Y Y Y 
Month FE Y Y Y 
Observations  1,759 1,759 1,759 
R-squared 0.792 0.791 0.791 
Note: Table reports regression coefficients and standard errors. Standard errors clustered at the household level. *: significant at 10% level; 
**: significant at 5% level; ***: significant at 1% level. Below median, Bottom quartile, Top quartile refers to distribution of individual 
earnings in the pre-policy period. For other notes see Table 2. 
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Table 13. Sources of income – Overall sample and by individual background 
Overall income Labour income Social benefits 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Post*Treat -11.63 2.712 -6.086 -11.19 -12.81 -3.072 2.983 3.549 -3.241 -0.658 -9.456 -0.952 -12.34 -8.164 -12.69 
(9.305) (20.51) (15.02) (9.904) (9.965) (5.037) (11.02) (7.200) (5.089) (5.745) (8.682) (17.29) (14.46) (9.216) (8.900) 
Post 32.37** 33.09** 16.85 28.77** 32.23** 10.10 14.31* 7.905 7.646 7.983 27.60** 26.70** 18.75 26.54** 28.45** 
(13.72) (15.58) (18.62) (14.14) (14.45) (6.929) (8.566) (8.599) (6.969) (7.096) (11.34) (13.30) (15.26) (11.70) (12.11) 
Post*Treat*Head -20.12 -8.278 -11.99 
(26.55) (11.65) (23.60) 
Post*Head -1.546 -6.575 1.217 
(13.92) (6.158) (12.45) 
Post*Treat*Female -11.89 -11.44 3.673 
(24.18) (9.619) (22.78) 
Post*Female 17.33 3.398 8.734 
(14.45) (6.078) (12.84) 
Post*Treat*21years 11.20 14.56 -13.88 
(31.83) (22.76) (23.66) 
Post*21years 14.46 9.757 5.510 
(9.116) (7.385) (6.794) 
Post*Treat*50/55 
years 8.660 -13.64 21.92 
(29.10) (13.41) (27.12) 
Post*50/55 years -4.907 -3.996 -5.971 
(16.64) (12.14) (15.27) 
Sample All All All All All All All All All All All All All All All 
Beds./person*Post N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 
Age*Post Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Tenure*Post Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Individual FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Wave FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
LA*Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations  5,326 5,326 5,326 5,326 5,326 4,989 4,989 4,989 4,989 4,989 5,326 5,326 5,326 5,326 5,326 
R-squared 0.779 0.779 0.779 0.779 0.779 0.787 0.787 0.787 0.787 0.787 0.810 0.811 0.811 0.810 0.811 
Note: Table reports regression coefficients and standard errors. Standard errors clustered at the household level. *: significant at 10% level; **: significant at 5% level; ***: significant at 1% level. 
For other notes see Table 2 and Table 11. 
38 
Table 14. Life satisfaction 
Health Income 
Amount of leisure 
time Life overall 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Post*Treat -0.127 -0.277 0.134 0.030 
(0.232) (0.207) (0.225) (0.194) 
Post -0.367 -0.194 0.202 -0.033 
(0.346) (0.326) (0.338) (0.316) 
Sample All All All All 
Beds./person*Post N N N N 
Age*Post Y Y Y Y 
Tenure*Post Y Y Y Y 
Individual FE Y Y Y Y 
Wave FE Y Y Y Y 
LA*Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Month FE Y Y Y Y 
Observations 4,121 4,102 4,106 4,117 
R-squared 0.732 0.717 0.651 0.734 
Note: Table reports regression coefficients and standard errors. Standard errors clustered at the household level. *: significant at 10% level; 
**: significant at 5% level; ***: significant at 1% level. For other notes see Table 2. 
39 
Figure 1. Event studies of the policy effect on the main outcomes 
Note: The graphs present estimates of the effect of the policy by quarters preceding and following the policy enforcement. Enforcement 
taking place in quarter 0. Announcement taking place in quarter -4. Event study centred on quarter -5 (the omitted group). This is the 
quarter just before the policy announcement. Benefits, income and mobility outcomes at the household level. Number of observations: 
3,427. Job outcome measured at the individual level. Number of observations: 5,326. Standard errors clustered at the household level in all 
panels but the last where they are clustered at the individual level. 90% confidence intervals displayed in the plots.
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Appendix Tables 
Appendix Table 1. Treatment and control groups before and after the policy 
Treatments Controls 
Number 
Observations 
Before 
Observations 
After Number 
Observations 
Before 
Observations 
After 
Households 198 624 281 620 1,935 941 
Movers 31 105 44 119 364 180 
Stayers 167 519 237 501 1,571 761 
Individuals 412 1,233 573 1,810 5,385 2,713 
Head of household 198 624 281 619 1,934 940 
Non-head of household 214 609 292 1,191 3,451 1,773 
Female 228 688 315 990 2,952 1,479 
Male 184 545 258 820 2,433 1,237 
16-21 years old 142 405 194 997 2,885 1,498 
>21 years old 270 828 379 813 2,500 1,215 
Working age 358 1,064 499 1,747 5,174 2,624 
Nearly retired 54 169 74 63 211 89 
Below median earnings – individuals 62 176 88 259 777 360 
Bottom earnings quartile – individuals 27 74 37 131 410 183 
Top earnings quartile – individuals 41 125 65 158 484 201 
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Appendix Table 2. Number of observations underlying sub-groups used in the analysis 
Male Female 
Head of 
Household 
Non-Head 
of 
household 
16-
21 
years 
old 
>21 
Years 
old 
Women 16- 
50 years old 
and men 16- 
55 years old 
Women >50 
years old 
and men >55 
years old 
Working 130 163 198 95 23 270 239 54 
Overall income 130 163 198 95 23 270 239 54 
Labour income 120 160 195 85 22 258 228 52 
Social benefits 130 163 198 95 23 270 239 54 
Satisfaction with health 95 138 171 62 19 214 187 46 
Satisfaction with income 95 138 171 62 19 214 187 46 
Satisfaction with amount of leisure 94 138 170 62 19 213 187 45 
Overall life satisfaction  95 138 171 62 19 214 187 46 
Appendix Table 3 . Group averages of main outcomes for the treated individuals before the reform 
Male Female 
Head of 
Household 
Non-Head 
of 
household 
16-21 
years old 
>21 
Years 
old 
Women 16- 
50 years old 
and men 16- 
55 years old 
Women >50 
years old 
and men >55 
years old 
Working 0.230 0.220 0.166 0.347 0.391 0.211 0.251 0.111 
Overall income 179.08 233.58 253.43 117.63 68.36 221.41 205.07 228.57 
Labour income 24.88 24.55 18.51 38.86 54.81 22.12 26.82 15.33 
Social benefits 150.98 202.79 228.67 77.96 9.913 194.28 172.50 212.13 
Satisfaction with health 3.242 3.644 3.239 4.145 5.000 3.345 3.625 2.891 
Satisfaction with income 3.010 3.014 2.847 3.467 3.789 2.943 3.149 2.456 
Satisfaction with amount 
of leisure 4.010 4.014 3.911 4.290 4.210 3.995 3.935 4.333 
Overall life satisfaction  3.800 3.862 3.602 4.483 5.105 3.724 3.871 3.695 
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